

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

August 21, 1973

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*

SUBJECT: Proposed Strategy on the Korean Question
in the U. N. General Assembly

At Tab II is a memorandum to you from Secretary Rogers summarizing his recent conversations in Seoul concerning our approach to the Korean question in this fall's U. N. General Assembly (UNGA). In his talks with South Korean leaders, Secretary Rogers:

-- Agreed to the termination of UNCURK and to hold in abeyance consideration of the future of the U. N. Command (UNC) "unless some attractive quid pro quo could be gained from the other side by its elimination."

-- Expressed strong support for the Republic of Korea's (ROK) initiative to secure membership for both Koreas (he now recommends that the U. S. undertake a campaign to this end, using this effort to counter the Communist side's anticipated campaign against the UNC and U. S. forces in the ROK).

-- Assured ROK leaders that we are well aware of their interest in our taking up with Peking and Moscow the Korean question in the U. N.

Our major objective in dealing with the Korean question in this UNGA session should be to minimize the risk of a major confrontation there, while assuring the retention of the UNC until we can secure satisfactory alternative security arrangements. We will not, until early next month, have a clear idea of how the Communist side intends to proceed tactically. We are, however, sufficiently aware of their general intentions to define our basic strategy now, and should do so in order to retain the initiative gained by President Park in his speech of June 23.

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--I agree with Secretary Rogers that UNCURK's report recommending its own termination should be submitted as soon as possible in order to sustain momentum on this issue, but believe we should not follow this up with a formal UNGA resolution on the report unless the other side attempts to have UNCURK terminated with prejudice to its past activities.

--The desirability of accepting any quid pro quo that is likely to be offered at the UNGA for the termination of UNC, is highly questionable. It is doubtful that the Communist side would, at this point: (1) give us a trade-off adequate to insure the continuation of security arrangements related to the UNC such as the Armistice Agreement and the Military Armistice Commission; (2) agree, at least tacitly, to reduce political pressure on our forces in the ROK. Thus, we should take the full time necessary between now and next year's UNGA to work out, with the other side and with the ROK and Japan, adjustments in UNC-related security arrangements that would avoid any reduction in the ROK's security which might result from a hasty termination of the Command. Finally, we have a good chance of holding the line against hostile action by the General Assembly against the UNC and U.S. forces in the ROK this year. If necessary, we can always block action against the UNC in the Security Council, which as the U.N. agency which created the UNC is the only body empowered to terminate it.

--While a preliminary survey indicates very substantial support for simultaneous admission of both Koreas to the UNGA, the other side could--and very likely would--veto the proposal in the Security Council. More importantly, there are substantial risks in attempting to counter the opposition's campaign against the UNC and U.S. forces with a campaign of our own for simultaneous admission. It would probably stimulate the other side to step up its campaign against the UNC and U.S. forces, thus producing the major confrontation we are seeking to avoid. We should, therefore, try to persuade the ROK to press its campaign for simultaneous admission less vigorously. We should, at the same time, assure the ROK of our support for a lower-key effort that would give us the tactical leverage this issue can provide against efforts to press for a hostile resolution on the UNC and U.S. forces in the ROK.

At Tab I is a draft memorandum from me to Secretary Rogers responding in your name to his memorandum to you, and outlining the above strategy for dealing with the Korean question in the upcoming UNGA.

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Recommendation:

That you approve my signing the draft memorandum to Secretary Rogers
at Tab I.

Approve

A handwritten signature, possibly "J. Edgar Hoover", is written over a horizontal line.

Disapprove

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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August 24, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Strategy on the Korean Question in the
U.N. General Assembly

The President has reviewed your July 31, 1973, report on your talks with ROK President Park and other leaders in Seoul. The President has decided that we should proceed on the Korean question in the UNGA in accordance with the following strategy:

-- Our basic objective should be to minimize the risk of a major confrontation in the UNGA, while preserving our essential policy position on the U.N. Command (UNC) and UNCURK.

-- We should seek to have the UNCURK report recommending termination of the organization submitted as soon as possible. We should not favor a formal UNGA resolution on the report, however, unless the Communist side attempts to have UNCURK terminated with prejudice to its past activities, or unless necessary to retain the initiative on UNCURK.

-- Our objective is to defeat any moves at this UNGA aimed at terminating the UNC. We should, therefore, undertake immediate representations to all potentially responsive UN members setting forth this position and explaining the substantial differences between the UNC and UNCURK.

-- Regarding the simultaneous admission of both Koreas to U.N. membership, we should try to persuade the ROK to press its campaign less vigorously, in order to avoid stimulating the opposition to make greater efforts in support of a hostile resolution on the UNC and U.S. forces in the ROK. The U.S. should be prepared to give modest support to the ROK's efforts to secure simultaneous admission in order (a) to support our Korean ally, and (b) to avail ourselves of the tactical leverage this issue can provide against possible opposition efforts to press for a hostile resolution on the UNC and U.S. forces in the ROK. The proposal for simultaneous admission should be phrased in a way that does not seem to impose U.N. membership on North Korea. At the same time, our effort both as regards simultaneous admission and the UNC/U.S. forces should be keyed to deal effectively with the level and character of challenge that may be raised by the opposition.

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In addition to the above, a study should be prepared presenting options and related scenarios on the following questions, and should be submitted for the President's consideration no later than August 30:

- . How we might prevent the UNC and U. S. forces in the ROK from becoming the center of a full-blown debate in this fall's UNGA.
- . How we might prevent the opposition from mobilizing majority support for UNGA action against the UNC and U. S. forces in the ROK.
- . How both legally and institutionally we could protect the continued effectiveness of the Armistice Agreement and the Military Armistice Commission, assuming a major attack on the UNC.


Henry A. Kissinger